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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE- Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc. v. 
Mayor ofBoston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Public works construction is a $55 billion industry' that has a 
broad based impact on the national economy. In Massachusetts 
alone, $675 million worth of public c~nstruction projects were initi­
ated in 1980.2 The industry is regulated by a myriad of statutes 
ranging from who is qualified to bid for a particular project3 to the 
terms of performance of an awarded contract.4 One such statute,S 
which provided employment preferences for Massachusetts residents 
in public works construction projects, was recently invalidated by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts Council 
of Construction Employers, Inc. v. Mayor ofBoston (MCCE).6 
The challenged statute created an absolute employment prefer­
ence for residents whenever private contractors engaged in public 
works projects of the commonwealth.7 The purpose of the statute, as 
found by the court, was to ease unemployment in the state and to 
ensure that public funds were spent in maximizing benefits to the 
1. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 30, Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ­
ers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346 (citing BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION REP.: VALUE OF NEW 
CONSTRUCTION PUT IN PLACE, c. 30-80-12, (1980}). 
2. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 9 n.6, Massachusetts Council of Constr. 
Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346. 
3. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 44A-44H (West 1982). 
4. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 39F-39L (West 1979 & Supp. 1982). 
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West 1982). The statute reads in perti­
nent part: 
In the employment of mechanics and apprentices, teamsters, chauffeurs and la­
borers in the construction of public works by the commonwealth, . . . or by 
persons contracting or subcontracting for such works, preference shall first be 
given to citizens 0/ the commonwealth who have been residents 0/ the common­
wealth for at least six months at the commencement of their employment. . . 
and who are qualified to perform the work to which the employment relates; 
. . . and if they cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers, then to citizens of the 
United States, and every contract for such work shall contain a provision to this 
effect. 
fd. (emphasis added). 
6. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346. 
7. fd. at 2044, 425 N.E.2d at 350. 
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locality where the monies were raised.s 
The major participants in the construction industry representing 
both labor and management,9 filed a complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the residency requirements of the statute and a hiring 
quota system established by an Executive Order of the city of Boston 
were unconstitutional. lO The court in the MCCE decision declared 
8. Id. at 2045, 425 N.E.2d at 350. The court deduced these general purposes from 
those purposes argued by the defendants: The promotion of employment of residents 
and the concomitant alleviation of unemployment; the reduction of economic and social 
costs to the commonwealth arising from unemployment; and the generation of secondary 
economic activities and tax revenues resulting from retention of public funds within the 
commonwealth. Brief for Defendant Dep't of Labor & Ind. at 5, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2039,425 N.E.2d 346. 
9. The individual plaintiffs were the Massachusetts State Building and Construc­
tion Trades Council AFL-CIO, the Building and Construction Trades Council of the 
Metropolitan District AFL-CIO, individual contractors incorporated in Massachusetts, 
individual contractors incorporated in Rhode Island, and members of sixteen trade un­
ions. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039 n.l, 425 N.E.2d at 346 n.1. The defendants were the 
City of Boston, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the Economic Development and 
Industrial Corporation, and the Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries. The 
Boston Jobs Coalition, Inc. intervened as a defendant. Id. at 2039 n.2, 425 N.E.2d at 346 
n.2. 
10. Id. at 2040-43, 425 N.E.2d at 347-49. The Executive Order of the city of Bos­
ton established a hiring preference quota system. In any construction project to which 
the city was a signatory to the construction contract, worker hours on a craft-by-craft 
basis had to be performed by: at least fifty percent bona fide Boston residents; at least 
twenty five percent minorities; and at least ten percent women. Id. at 2040 n.4, 245 
N.E.2d at 347 n.4. 
A single justice, who heard the original action, reserved and reported ten questions 
to the full courts: 
I. Is the application of G. L. c. 149, § 26, to construction projects involv­
ing Federal assistance invalid because it is in conflict with the Federal statutes 
(and rules and regulations derived therefrom) authorizing such assistance and/ 
or is such application of the statute invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution? 
2. Does G. L. c. 149, § 26, conflict with the privileges and immunities 
clause, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, the contract clause 
and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, and does it conflict 
with Articles I, X, and XII of the Massachusetts Constitution? 
3. Does G. L. c. 149, § 26, conflict with the obligations of the plaintiffs 
under the National Labor Relations Act, and is it therefore invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution? 
4. Is the application of the residency aspects of Executive Order to con­
struction projects involving Federal assistance invalid because in conflict with 
the federal statutes (and rules and regulations derived therefrom) authorizing 
such assistance and/or is such application of the Executive Order invalid under 
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution? 
5. Does the Executive Order, by establishing a residents' preference, con­
flict with the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, the equal 
protection clause, the contract clause and the commerce clause of the United 
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that the residency preference requirement of the statute ll violated 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States 
Constitution. 12 
This note will examine the history of the privileges and immuni­
ties clause and the various judicial tests proposed to construe it. Ad­
ditionally, the note will examine the MCCE case and criticize that 
decision's misplaced reliance on other authority. I3 
Privileges and immunities litigation has been confused and en­
tangled with decisions that have cast ambiguity on the principles of 
States Constitution, and does it conflict with Article I, Article [X) and Article 
XII of the Massachusetts Constitution? 
6. Do the residency aspects of Executive Order conflict with the obliga­
tion ofthe plaintiffs under the National Labor Relations Act, and is it therefore 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution? 
7. Are the residency aspects of Executive Order invalid under Section 6 
or Section 7(5) of Article 89 of the amendments to the Constitution of Massa­
chusetts, and/or G. L. c. 43B, § 13 (the Home Rule Procedures Act)? 
8. Does the BRA violate the provisions ofG. L. c. 121A by conditioning 
approval of application for tax status under that Chapter upon an applicant's 
acceptance of Section 8 of the BRA's 'Rules and Regulations Governing Chap­
ter 121A Projects in the City of Boston'? 
9. Are the residency aspects of the Executive Order invalid as beyond the 
inherent power of the Mayor under the City Charter? 
10. Is the conditioning of a developer's application for a UDAG [Urban 
Development Action Grant) upon his agreement to abide by the residency as­
pects of the Executive Order in conflict with 42 U.S.c. sec. 5301 ef seq. and/or 
is such conditioning invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution? 
Id. at 2042 n.9, 425 N.E.2d at 348-49 n.9. 
This note will not examine the rulings on the Executive Order of the city of Boston 
held to violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Id. at 2052-54, 425 
N.E.2d at 354-55, or the ruling that neither the statute nor the Executive Order conflicted 
with the National Labor Relations Act and therefore did not violate the federal preemp­
tion doctrine under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 2043, 
425 N.E.2d at 349. The Executive Order was recently declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers Inc., 103 S. Ct. 
1042 (1983). The subject of this note was not at issue upon the appeal. 
II. Only the residency preference of the statute was before the court. The six 
month durational requirement of the statute was not at issue. This aspect of the statute 
required that in order for a person to be given the hiring preference under the statute, the 
person must have been a resident of the state for at least the six months prior to his 
commencing employment. Id. at 2041 n.6, 425 N.E.2d at 348 n.6. See supra note 5. 
Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
12. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039, 425 N.E.2d at 346. The Privileges and Immuni­
ties clause of the United States Constitution reads as follows: "The Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. 
13. Eg., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). See infra notes 95-105 and ac­
companying text. 
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the clause. 14 With the recent increase in privileges and immunities 
clause litigation,15 the court had an opportunity to develop a consis­
tent basis for privileges and immunities analysis. It will be demon­
strated that instead of examining and weighing the facts, the court 
has misplaced its reliance on other authority by disregarding the 
valid distinctions between the cases l6 and applied the proper stan­
dard of analysis only in a cursory fashion. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The language of the privileges and immunities clause was 
adopted from Article IV of the Articles of Confederation. 17 That 
article declared its purpose as promoting "mutual friendship and in­
tercourse among the people of the different states in the Union."18 
The clause was adopted by the Constitutional Convention without 
great debate and placed in Article IV, along with other sections that 
concerned interstate relationships.19 
The Supreme Court has attempted to establish a standard to 
effectuate the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause. The 
result has been a line of cases that have created varying tests which 
have caused difficulty and confusion for the courts in their 
analysis.20 
The first major case to consider the application of the privileges· 
and immunities clause was Coifield v. Coryel/,21 in which Circuit 
14. See, e.g., Note, Lookingfor Privileges and Immunities, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 89 
(1975). 
15. A search of all reported cases in the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, the 
circuit courts and the highest court of each state for the years 1950 through 1982 revealed 
that privileges and immunities litigation is increasing. For the 10 year period from 1950 
to 1959, II cases discussed the privileges and immunities clause. This number rose to 25 
for the 1960 to 1969 period, and to 88 for the 1970 to 1979 period. For the period from 
1980 to June 1982, the number of cases was 46, which, if extrapolated to 1989, would 
predict 184 cases on this subject. This progression shows that the number of cases that 
consider the privileges and immunities clause more than doubles in every ten years. 
16. See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
17. Knox, Prospective Applications of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the United States Constitution, 43 Mo. L. REV. 1,5 (1978). 
18. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV. "The better to secure and perpetuate 
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, 
the free inhabitants of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice ex­
cepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several 
States...." Id. 
19. 3 M. Farrand, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 112, 173 
(1911). 
20. See, Note, supra note 14, at 94. 
21. 6 F. C. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (Justice Bushrod Washington on circuit). 
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Court Justice Bushrod Washington upheld a New Jersey statute that 
made it unlawful for nonresidents to gather shellfish in New Jersey 
waters. 22 In determining whether the clause encompassed shellfish­
ing, Justice Washington examined the. rights at issue.23 Under his 
standard, the privileges and immunities clause would apply to those 
rights 
which are, in their nature,Jundamental; which belong, of right, to 
the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, 
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose 
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, 
and sovereign. . . . [Including the] right of a citizen of one state 
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of 
trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise.24 
Therefore, the Court's early judicial interpretation of the clause es­
tablished that only fundamental rights were protected by the clause, 
and that the court could determine which rights were (and, con­
versely, which were not) fundamental.25 
In Paul v. Virginia ,26 the Court changed the focus of its analysis 
of the privileges and immunities clause from protecting the funda­
mental rights of citizens of a free government to that of protecting 
nonresidents from discrimination by states and insuring them the 
same rights as residents of those states.27 Against a privileges and 
immunities clause challenge, the Court upheld a Virginia statute that 
required out-of-state insurance companies to place a deposit of thirty 
to fifty thousand dollars with the state treasury in order to do busi­
ness in the state.28 The Court reasoned that a corporation was not a 
person under the privileges and immunities clause and that the 
clause did not secure, in a foreign state, the special privileges granted 
to a citizen by his own state.29 Rather, the clause secured to a non­
resident the identical privileges and immunities that the state 
22. Id. at 555. 
23. fd. at 550-55. 
24. Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added). 
25. See id. 
26. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
27. Id. at 180. 
28. fd. at 168. 
29. Id. The creation of a corporation is the exercise of a state law. This special 
privilege cannot extend outside the boundaries of the sovereignty in which it was created. 
Therefore. another state is totally free to recognize or place conditions on its recognition 
of an out-of-state corporation. Any other construction of the privileges and immunities 
clause would destroy the independence and harmony of the states the clause was envi­
sioned to create. Id. at 181. 
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granted to its own citizens under the laws and constitution of that 
state.30 
III. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION 
The case of Toomer v. Witsell31 announced what has been char­
acterized as the modem approach to privileges and immunities 
clause protection.32 In Toomer, the Court struck down a South Car­
olina statute, as violative of the privileges and immunities clause, 
because it limited commercial access to migratory shrimp in the 
three-mile maritime belt off the state's coast.33 The statute limited 
commercial access by imposing a license fee one hundred times 
greater for each nonresident shrimp boat.34 The Court created a 
"substantial reason" test as the criterion for privileges and immuni­
ties protection.35 The Court stated that the clause did not create an 
absolute right to equal treatment, but that it did bar discrimination 
against nonresidents unless there were substantial reasons for the dis­
crimination, beyond the mere fact that the nonresidents were not cit­
izens of a particular state.36 The clause allowed disparity of 
treatment of nonresidents, but only when supported by "valid in­
dependent reasons"37 and an indication that nonresidents were the 
peculiar source ofthe evil at which the statute was aimed.38 
From this, it is evident that the task of the judiciary is to deter­
mine whether such independent reasons exist and whether they war­
30. Id. at 180. 
31. 334 U.S. 385 (1948). 
32. See Note, supra note 14, at 99; Note, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV: Fundamental Rights Revived, 55 WASH. L. REV. 461 (1980). 
In Paul, the Court had established an absolute state discrimination standard. If one 
state gave its citizen a certain right then that right must also be extended to nonresidents. 
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180. Toomer is a more flexible standard and allows state discrimina­
tion of nonresidents when a valid justification can be shown. See infra note 37 and ac­
companying text. 
33. 334 U.S. at 399. The Court found that the practical effect of the statute was 
exclusionary and that the record did not show any supporting evidence that nonresidents 
were a peculiar source ofevil. The record did not show, for example, that nonresidents 
use larger boats or that they were in fact the cause of higher costs of enforcement. Id. at 
398. 
34. Id. at 395. 
35. Id. at 396. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. The Court stated that the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause 
was to help "fuse into one Nation" the several states and to ensure to a nonresident the 
same privileges which the citizens of the state enjoy. Id. at 395. For some recent exam­
ples of valid discrimination under the privileges and immunities clause, see infra notes 
96- \0 I and accompanying text. 
38. 334 U.S. at 398. 
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rant the degree of discrimination created by the state action.39 In 
making this determination, the Court must be sensitive to the state's 
role of proscribing means to alleviate local problems.40 
Toomer drastically shifted privileges and immunities analysis 
from an absolute dichotomous approach of whether a fundamental 
right existed to a more flexible standard of state justification of dis­
criminatory actions.41 The fundamental rights approach of Coifield 
has been displaced by the anti-discrimination approach of the post­
Toomer decisions.42 
The two most recent Supreme Court decisions involving the 
privileges and immunities clause, however, reveal that the present 
Court is uncertain of the Toomer approach and is cautiously consid­
ering reversion to the fundamental rights analysis. 
In Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission ,43 the court upheld a 
Montana hunting license statute that charged nonresidents as much 
as twenty-five times more than a resident for the equivalent license.44 
39. Id. at 396. 
40. Id. 
41. Professor Tribe suggests that this change in focus is so thorough that the funda­
mental rights approach is no longer important. The fundamental rights doctrine was first 
used as a limitation on the rigid approach of judicial intervention of state rights. Today, 
with a more t1exible standard of allowing the states to discriminate in only properly justi­
fied situations, there is no longer the need to narrow the scope of the privileges and 
immunities clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 411 n.16 (1978). 
42. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 
420 U.S. 656 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 
415 (1952); Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980); Lung v. O'Chesky, 94 
N.M. 802,617 P.2d 1317 (1980); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 
909,423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cerro denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Construction and Gen. 
Laborers Union Local 563 v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (1965); 
State V. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 847 (1976). 
In Mullaney V. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a 
statute charging nonresidents ten times more than residents for a fishing license. Because 
the state did not show a reasonable relation between the higher license fees or any addi­
tional costs to the territory, the Court held that the statute violated the privileges and 
immunities clause. Id. at 417-18. 
43. 436 U.S. 371 (1978). 
44. Id. at 388. The license scheme charged residents $9.00 for a license to hunt elk 
only and $30.00 for a combination license to hunt elk, deer, black bear and game birds. 
Nonresidents could not purchase a license to hunt elk only and were required to 
purchase the combination license at a price of $225.00. Id. at 373-74. 
The Baldwin Court first cited Paul V. Virginia, as setting out the purpose of the 
privileges and immunities clause to eliminate state discrimination of nonresidents by en­
suring nonresidents the same privileges and immunities that residents enjoy. Id. at 380; 
see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. The Court then quoted Hague V. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496 (1939), for the proposition that it was the well settled view in privileges and 
immunities analysis that a person did not carry with him fundamental rights merely be­
cause of his citizenship; but that a nonresident visiting any state had the same privileges 
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In reconciling the different approaches used by other courts,45 the 
Court set up two categories that distinguished the cases: those situa­
tions that were permitted because they reflected the fact that the na­
tion is composed of individual states;46 and those "other" situations47 
that are prohibited because they hinder the formation, purpose and 
development of the nation.48 The Court concluded that the privi­
leges and immunities clause only protects those rights that are vital 
to the maintenance of the nation as a single entity.49 Therefore, the 
first step in the analysis must be a determination into which category 
the challenged statute falls;50 that is, whether it concerns a funda­
mental right. After such a determination, the Court would then con­
sider whether the challenged statute could be justified by the state 
under the Toomer substantial reason test.51 
Using this two step analysis, the Court found that elk hunting 
was not a fundamental right under the first part of the test and up­
held the statute as not violative of the privileges and immunities 
clause.52 The decision was based upon an ownership theory53 which 
presupposes that a state has a right to control and regulate resources 
that it owns, provided that the state does not interfere with interstate 
commerce, the proper exercise of federal power, or the right to pur­
sue a livelihood in another state as protected by the clause. 54 
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, strongly criticized the renewal of 
the fundamental rights limitation. 55 He believed that it was time to 
clearly state what had been implicit in modem privileges and immu­
nities analysis: that a fundamental rights approach should have no 
and immunities as the residents of that state. 436 U.S. at 381 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496, 511 (1939». The Court then recognized valid situations where residency might 
be used to distinguish between persons, as, for example, in the areas of voting rights, 
qualifications of an elected state official and the application of state laws and services. 
436 U.S. at 383. 
45. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text. 
46. See supra note 44. 
47. The Court did not give specific examples of this category and did not decide 
the range of activities that would fit into this category. 436 U.S. at 388. 
48. Id. at 383. 
49. Id. 
50. /d. at 383-84. 
51. Id. at 386-87. 
52. Id. at 388. 
53. See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text. 
54. 436 U.S. at 385-86 (citations omitted). The reasons stated by the Court were: 
Elk hunting is a sport, not a means of livelihood; nonresidents were not totally excluded 
from hunting elk; and the elk supply is finite and must be carefully tended in order to 
preserve it. Id. at 388. 
55. Id. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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weight in considering whether a state's discrimination has violated 
the clause.56 Rather, he believed the Court's primary concern should 
be the state's justification for its discrimination.57 
One month later, Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous 
Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck,58 invalidated an Alaska law which re­
quired that qualified state residents be hired preferentially over 
equally qualified nonresidents for any employment resulting from an 
oil and gas lease, easement or right of way when the State of Alaska 
was a party to those leases or permits. 59 Justice Brennan, relying on 
the reasoning of his dissent in Baldwin, required a state justification 
of the discrimination without considering a fundamental rights anal­
ysis.60 Justice Brennan found the statute did not meet the substantial 
reason test: first, it swept more broadly than necessary to achieve the 
goal of relieving unemployment since that could have been accom­
plished by a statute specifically aimed at the unemployed;61 second, 
there was no evidence that the nonresidents were the peculiar source 
of Alaska's unemployment;62 and third, Justice Brennan rejected the 
theory that Alaska's ownership of oil and gas gave the authority to 
place conditions on the sale or lease of that resource.63 The statute 
was "an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit[ed] in 
some way from the economic ripple effect" of Alaska's oil and gas 
resources, to prefer employment of state residents.64 The Court be­
lieved Alaska's ownership of these resources did not constitute suffi­
cient justification for the pervasive discrimination against 
nonresidents that the statute required.65 
56. Id. 
57. Id. Justice Brennan then looked at the case under the Toomer approach of the 
substantial reason test and determined that there was no justification for the discrimina­
tion as a method to conserve elk, a means to reduce the costs of additional enforcement 
due to nonresidents, or based upon the right of a state to control the resources that it 
owns. Id. at 402-06. 
58. 437 U.S. 518 (1978). 
59. Id. at 520. 
60. Id. at 525-26. 
61. Id. at 528. The statute preferred employed, as well as unemployed, residents 
over nonresidents. The Court believed the statute was overly broad and was not directed 
at the problem it sought to remedy. Id. at 527-28. 
62. Id. at 526. The Court distilled the substantial reasons required by Toomer to 
be the lack of less restrictive alternatives. Further, the Court determined that Alaska's 
unemployment was due to the lack of education and job training of residents and be­
cause of the geographical remoteness of residents from job opportunities. Id. at 526-27. 
63. Id. at 528-31. 
64. Id. at 531. 
65. Id. at 531. State ownership is an important factor to be considered in a privi­
leges and immunities analysis. Id. at 528-29. See Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 
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Although the Court does not always agree on the proper frame­
work for analyzing the privileges and immunities clause, courts and 
commentators agree that the clause facilitates national unification by 
giving citizens who venture outside their own state some federal pro­
tection.66 The issue is the extent of that protection and Hicklin de­
fined the substantial reason test as the appropriate means to 
determine that extent.67 The test was to examine whether first, the 
presence or activity of nonresidents was the peculiar source ofthe evil 
the state was attempting to remedy; and second, if the discrimination 
practiced against nonresidents bore a substantial relation to the 
problem they represented.68 This balancing approach, then, weighs 
the interests of the state against the discriminatory actions toward 
nonresidents. Hicklin did not hold that a residency preference stat­
ute was invalid per se ,69 but rather held that the challenged statute 
514,524,399 N.E.2d 909, 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878,883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 
(1980). In McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), the Supreme Court created an 
absolute exception which allowed a state to do as it saw fit with the resources that it 
owned. In McCready, a nonresident plaintiff challenged a Virginia statute which prohib­
ited nonresidents from planting shellfish in Virginia waters. The Court ruled that Vir­
ginia owned the tidewaters and their beds and therefore, had the power to use those areas 
as they saw fit. Id. at 396. The McCready doctrine, which was based solely on an owner­
ship theory, exempted a state from scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause. 
See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 384-86; Ebbeson v. Board of Public Educ. in Wilmington, 18 
Del. Ch. 37,43-45, 156 A. 286, 289 (1931) (The McCready exception applies to public 
revenues in construction of public works.) Over time, the McCready doctrine has been 
reduced from an absolute exception to a crucial factor in determining whether the state's 
discrimination against nonresidents violates the privileges and immunities clause. See 
supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
66. Courts have held the following to be privileges protected by the privileges and 
immunities clause: the right to have equal treatment with respect to taxes, Austin v. New 
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); to have access to hospitals, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973); to enjoy freedom of travel among the states, Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 
(1919); to engage in business, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); and to own, sell 
and deal with personal property in another state, Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). 
See also Knox, supra note 17. 
67. 437 U.S. at 525-26. Another view reconciles Baldwin and Hicklin as requiring 
a two-step analysis. The first step is to determine whether a fundamental right has been 
infringed. If so, the first step is met, and the court will reach the second step and apply 
the substantial reason test. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term - Forward: On Dis­
covering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 78-86; Recent Cases, Commerce 
Clause-Privileges and Immunities Clause-State Hiring Discrimination Against Nonresi­
dents, 12 AKRON L. REV. 346; Note, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A Reaffirma­
tion 0/ Fundamental Rights, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1979) [hereinafter Fundamental 
Rights). But see Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518; State v. Nolfi, 141 N.J. Super. 528, 358 A.2d 853 
(1976); Note, supra note 14, at 107-110; Note, Domicile Priferences in Employment: The 
Case ofAlaska Hire, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1069 [hereinafter Alaska Hire); Note, supra note 32. 
68. See Ely, supra note 67, at 75-76. 
69. 437 U.S. at 528. 
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must pass the scrutiny of the substantial reason test.70 
The Hicklin balancing approach of privileges and immumtIes 
analysis closely resembles the analysis of the commerce clause71 and 
the equal protection clause.72 Because these clauses are also federal 
limitations on state and local power, the similarity in analysis lends 
additional support for the validity of the Hicklin approach. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In MCCE, the residency preference was challenged on a variety 
of grounds, both statutory and constitutional.73 Because none of the 
statutory challenges invalidated the preference statute,74 the court 
70. /d. at 527. 
71. The commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause have a "mutu­
'ally reinforcing relationship [due 	to) their common origin in the Fourth Article of the 
Articles of Confederation." Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted). See infra note 132 and 
accompanying text. Hicklin acknowledged this relationship by invalidating the statute 
on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause and used the commerce clause as a 
gauge for improper discrimination. Id. Whether or not resources are destined for inter­
state commerce becomes a factor in determining what permissible discriminations will be 
allowed. Id. at 531-33. For similar commerce clause cases that invalidate state laws 
discriminating against nonresidents in receiving goods of interstate commerce, see Fos­
ter-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. I (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). BUI see 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617 (1978); Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 
794 (1976); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd mem., 
409 U.S. 904 (1972). 
72. The closeness between the valid state interest and the resulting discrimination 
of nonresidents required by the substantial reason test in Hicklin, resembles the interme­
diate level of scrutiny applied in equal protection cases. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 67, at 
86; Tribe, supra note 33, at 411 n.17. The standards used in Toomer and Austin v. New 
Hampshire, 420 U.S. 696 (1975), have also been compared to the intermediate level of 
scrutiny of equal protection. For a discussion of their relationship see Alaska Hire, supra 
note 67, at 1081; Fundamen/al Righls, supra note 67, at 698-99. 
F or cases that consider nonresident discrimination under an equal protection basis, 
see Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); San Antonio Indep. 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
73. See supra note lO and accompanying text. 
74. One such challenge that failed was the preemption doctrine, which prevents a 
state from frustrating a federal policy as promulgated under any federal statute. The 
MCCE court held that the preference statute was not preempted under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because the statute did not interfere with the negotiation 
process between the unions and the employers. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 425 N.E.2d 
at 351. The Massachusetts statute was neutral and did not alter the bargaining position 
of either party. /d. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL­
CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Note, Slale Reg­
ulalion of Employmen/ 0/ Illegal Aliens is nOI per se Preempled by Federal COn/rol over 
Immigralion or by Ihe Immigralion and Nalionalily ACI, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87 (1977). 
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reached the constitutional issues, including the privileges and immu­
nities clause. 
The MCCE court cited Toomer, to establish the basic purpose 
of the clause as being to secure to nonresidents the same privileges 
that residents of the state enjoy.75 The court recognized that states 
were not prevented from favoring their own citizens in certain cir­
cumstances76 but that definite limitations existed on the preferential 
methods that could pass constitutional muster.?7 
The court followed the two step analytical framework of Bald­
win ,78 which first determined if the right under consideration was 
fundamental and, second, if the discrimination could be justified, 
either by a showing that nonresidents were a peculiar source of the 
evil that the statute was aimed to remedy, or if there was a valid 
independent reason for the discrimination other than the mere fact 
of nonresidency.79 
The MCCE court cited Rubin v. Glaser80 and Lung v. 
O'Cheskysl as examples of valid state discrimination against nonres­
idents tested under the substantial reason doctrine.82 In Rubin, a 
New Jersey Homestead Rebate Act that applied only to the principal 
residence of New Jersey residents was upheld. s3 The Act was en­
acted to alleviate the heavy burden of realty taxes on the principal 
place of residence of New Jersey residents.84 The court justified the 
decision on the basis that the Act was closely related to its purpose85 
and the Act did not discriminate solely against nonresidents.86 In 
Lung, the court upheld a grocery and medical tax rebate to New 
75. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2046, 425 N.E.2d at 351. (citing Toomer, 334 U.S. at 
395). 
76. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (favoring state citizens in selling 
concrete from a state-owned plant during shortages); Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) 
(charging nonresidents substantially higher license fees for recreational hunting). 
77. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N.E.2d at 351. The court cited Philadelphia 
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978), a commerce clause case, which sets the limits of 
preferential treatment as whenever the state attempts to isolate itself from the national 
economy. 
78. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
79. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N.E.2d at 351. 
80. 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980). 
81. 94 N.M. 802,617 P.2d 1317 (1980). 
82. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2047, 425 N .E.2d at 351. 
83. 83 N.J. at 304, 416 A.2d at 384. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 307, 416 A.2d at 386-87. 
86.. Id. Residents of New Jersey who rented or had a summer home did not qual­
ify for the rebate and were discriminated against along with the nonresidents. Id. 
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Mexico residents.87 The legitimate state purpose of granting relief 
from gross receipts and property taxes to individuals who actually 
paid those taxes, was the substantial reason for the distinction be­
tween residents and nonresidents.88 
In assessing whether the statute discriminated against a funda­
mental right, the MCCE court cited Coljield as having established 
that the privileges and immunities clause protected the right of a citi­
zen to go into another state for purposes of trade, agriculture and 
professional pursuits.89 After reviewing subsequent fundamental 
right decisions,90 the court concluded that limiting a particular kind 
of work opportunity on the basis of residency impinged upon the 
fundamental right of pursuing a livelihood.91 
The second prong of the test in the MCCE decision is the sub­
stantial reason test of Toomer.92 The MCCE court concluded that 
Hicklin was controlling on these facts, and had established a clear 
rule forbidding a state to use its control of a resource to create an 
absolute hiring preference of residents.93 
The court rejected the two principle arguments used by the state 
to distinguish Hicklin. First, the state claimed that the statute regu­
lated employment, a limited resource, as opposed to an unlimited 
resource like oil or gas. Secondly, the state argued, it was acting as a 
market participant94 in the construction of projects and therefore 
should be able to act, as in commerce clause cases, without the re­
strictions of the privileges and immunities clause.95 
In considering the limited resource distinction, the court ac­
knowledged that a state preference of residents could be allowed 
when a resource was limited but noted that there must be a showing 
that the resources were overburdened.96 Hicklin also required a 
87. 94 N.M. at 805, 617 P.2d at 1320. 
88. Id. Since nonresidents did not pay those taxes, a rebate to them would not 
further the relief contemplated by the legislature. Id. 
89. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. at 552. 
90. The court also recognized that the right involved in MCCE was the pursuit of a 
livelihood and cited Toomer and Baldwin in support. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2048, 425 
N.E.2d at 352. 
91. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 425 N.E.2d at 352. See also Toomer v. Witsell, 
334 U.S. 385 (1948); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Chalker v. Birmingham 
& N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514,399 N.E.2d 
909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979). 
92. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
93. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049-50, 425 N.E.2d at 352-53. 
94. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
95. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 425 N.E.2d at 353. 
96. Id. This view is supported by dicta in Doe v. Bolton, 4\0 U.S. 179 (1973) 
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showing that the nonresidents be the peculiar source ofthe evtl, when 
unemployment was considered,97 and the MCCE court determined 
that this was not shown.98 
The second argument by the state, the market participant doc­
trine, has been a recognized exception to the commerce clause in 
situations in which a state is acting in a proprietary manner in pro­
viding or purchasing goods and services.99 The rationale of the doc­
trine is that when a state is pursuing its own proprietary business 
interests instead of regulating private industry, it should be free to 
choose with whom it will do business, just as any other individual 
may. 100 
The MCCE court followed precedent and agreed that the com­
which intimated that if state facilities were utilized to capacity, a statute giving preferen­
tial access to Georgia residents of these state owned facilities might be allowed. Id. at 
200. 
97. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
98. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2050, 425 N.E.2d at 353. 
99. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aJl'd mem., 
409 U.S. 904 (1972) (state proprietary functions are exempt from commerce clause scru­
tiny). See also infra notes lOO-OJ. 
100. The commerce clause does not concern itself with a state entering the market­
place as a purchaser or prescribing the conditions under which a state will do business. 
When a state is spending state money, courts seem to exempt the state from commerce 
clause restrictions. Aside from this generalization that states do not have to spend state 
money to promote the interests of nonresidents, no clear guidelines are available. See 
Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction In Constitutional Law, 66 
VA. L. REV. 1073. See also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexan­
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 
719 (M.D. Fla.), ajJ'dmem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); People ex rei. Holland v. Bleigh Constr. 
Co., 61 Ill. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975). 
The market participant doctrine has been recently cited in Reeves as a valid consid­
eration. 447 U.S. at 438. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1,58-63 
(1976). The Reeves Court also referred to Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) in sup­
port of the validity of the proprietary interest. 447 U.S. at 438-39. 
Heim upheld a statute, similar to the MCCE statute, but on an equal protection 
basis. 239 U.S. at 193. The Court in Hicklin referred to Heim as being of dubious value 
in a privileges and immunities analysis. 437 U.S. at 531 n.15. The MCCE decision fol­
lowed the Hicklin Court in not considering the value of Heim, which recognized the 
proprietary interest of a state to "have control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions 
upon which it will permit public work to be done on its behalf ...." Heim, 239 U.S. at 
191. The continuing vitality of this portion of Heim was recognized in C.D.R. Enter­
prises v. Board of Educ. of New York, 412 F. Supp. 1164, 1169-70 (1976). 
Heim and its companion case, Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) can be dis­
tinguished from Hicklin. Both Heim and Crane involved purely public works construc­
tion of subways and sewers and involved only state funds rather than employment in all 
businesses connected with Alaska's oil and gas. Alaska Hire, supra note 67, at 1091. 
Hicklin avoided the issue of whether a more narrowly drawn statute would allow a 
state to properly prefer its residents on public works. Instead of examining Heim and 
Crane, the Court believed the cases were not pertinent because they were decided upon 
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merce clause would allow a state to prefer its own residents when it 
was purchasing goods 101 or services,102 or distributing state-pro­
duced materials. 103 But the court distinguished the commerce clause 
cases by concluding that the market participant doctrine exception 
extended only to a state granting an initial sale or contract. Further, 
as the Supreme Court did not apply the doctrine to the absolute em­
ployment preference statute in Hicklin, 104 the MCCE court was un­
willing to extend the doctrine in the present case. 105 
The court also cited Sal/a v. County ofMonroe 106 in support of 
its decision because the court in Sal/a invalidated a New York stat­
ute nearly identical to the Massachusetts statute on a privileges and 
an equal protection basis. 437 U.S. at 531 n.15. See Ely, SIIpra note 67, at 83 n.47; Knox, 
supra note 17, at 22-24. 
If the state is the employer and state funds are being spent to develop the resource, 
Hicklin seems to indicate that the proprietary interests of the state may be controlling 
and the regulation upheld if narrowly drawn. 437 U.S. at 528. 
This is to be distinguished from municipal hiring cases. When a government is an 
employer, it may impose restrictions on the activities of its employees as conditions of 
further employment. This has been upheld based upon the permanence of and reliance 
of the community on public service employment. Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn. 
277,143 N.W.2d 200 (1966). See also Wardell v. Board of Educ. of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d 
625 (6th Cir. 1976); Town of Milton v. Civil Service Comm'n, 365 Mass. 368, 312 N.E.2d 
188 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 
(1971). . 
101. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), where Maryland 
offered a bounty for every junk car titled in Maryland that was converted into scrap. The 
documentation required to be eligible for the bounty was more demanding on nonresi­
dents than residents and the effect of the law restricted the flow of junk cars to nonresi­
dent scrap companies. Id. at 801-03. The Supreme Court upheld the statute against a 
commerce clause challenge because Maryland had not sought to prohibit the flow of 
goods but instead entered the market and bid up the price as a purchaser thereby restrict­
ing its trade to its own citizens. Id. at 808. 
102. See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd 
mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (Florida statute requiring the state to obtain printing services 
from in-state printers was upheld because state proprietary functions are exempt from 
commerce clause scrutiny). 
103. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). In Reeves, a South Dakota 
statute that required favoring its citizens in the sale of cement produced from a state­
owned plant during an actual shortage period was upheld. Id. at 436. The Court relied 
on the market participant doctrine to allow the state, in the absence of congressional 
action, to act without the restrictions of the commerce clause. Id. at 434-36. See also 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). 
104. 437 U.S. at 531. 
105. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051,425 N.E.2d at 353. Why the court did not con­
sider the awarding of a public works construction project to be an initial granting of a 
contract but rather relied on Hicklin once again is not indicated in the opinion. 
106. 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1979), cerl. denied, 446 
U.S. 909 (1980). 
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immunities clause basis. 107 
In Salla, the New York Court of Appeals emphasized two ma­
jor facts in its decision. First, the broad statutory language did not 
prefer unemployed over employed persons. \08 This was given con­
siderable weight in Hicklin .109 Second, the public works projects in 
Salla were largely funded by federal sources so that a valid market 
participant doctrine argument could not be made. I \0 
In conclusion, the MCCE court relied heavily on Hicklin as 
controlling but did not distinguish the types of employment involved 
in the two cases. The court also did not believe that the market par­
ticipant doctrine applied to the MCCE fact situation. 
An initial examination of Hinklin shows similarities to MCCE. 
In both, the absolute preference was very broad because it favored 
employed as well as unemployed residents over nonresidents. I II No 
showing was made, in either court, that the nonresidents were the 
peculiar source of the unemployment that the statute was aimed to 
remedy.ll2 The alleviation of state unemployment, by excluding 
nonresidents, is inconsistent with the purpose of the privileges and 
immunities clause to promote comity and national economic unity 
among the states.ll3 The MCCE decision correctly recognized these 
similarities I 14 but failed to perceive the more subtle distinctions. 
The major distinction between Hicklin and MCCE is the type of 
employment that the statutes regulated. In Hicklin, the statute regu­
lated all private employment generated by any oil and gas activity in 
the state. I 15 The challenged Massachusetts law in MCCE was more 
107. Id. at 518, 399 N.E.2d at 910, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 879. 
108. /d. at 523, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882. 
109. /d. at 524-25, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883. 
110. Id. The doctrine is premised on the state spending state money in its proprie­
tary actions. See Knox, supra note 17, at 21. 
The MCCE court did not reject the market participant doctrine on a similar federal 
funding basis when it considered the statute, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051, 425 N.E.2d at 
353-54, but clearly did so when it invalidated the Executive Order. Id. at 2053, 425 
N.E.2d at 355. If federal funds were involved in projects under the statute, a more credi­
ble argument could be made that the market participant doctrine is inapplicable. 
Ill. See supra notes 7 & 61 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 62 & 98 and accompanying text; Salla, 48 N.Y.2d at 523, 399 
N.E.2d at 913-14, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882; Construction and Gen. Laborers Union Local 563 
v. City of St. Paul, 270 Minn. 427, 134 N.W.2d 26 (distinctions in classifying persons 
must be based on reasonable and substantial facts to justify the imposition of special 
legislation). 
113. See supra notes 18-72 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
115. 437 U.S. at 529-31. See generally Recent Cases, supra note 67, at 356; Alaska 
Hire, supra note 67, at 1091. 
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narrowly drawn and focused on a hybrid of public employment. 1 16 
A public works project, whether done by the state or one of its in­
strumentalities, is a public, not private, character, 117 and the employ­
ment is a matter of major public concern. This distinction was 
determinative in Holland v. Bleigh Construction Company,1l8 an Illi­
nois case upholding a resident preference statute for the employment 
of laborers on public works projects. The Holland court believed the 
state had a valid interest in promoting the employment of its resi­
dents if the degree of discrimination against nonresident laborers on 
public works projects bore a close relation to this valid purpose. 1 19 
While the MCCE defendants made the identical argument,120 the 
court's opinion did not address it. l2l 
Although the Massachusetts statute was more narrowly drawn 
than Alaska's, the statute still preferred employed and unemployed 
residents over unemployed nonresidents. There is no substantial 
reason for preferring employed residents over unemployed nonresi­
dents.122 This is particularly true, when the statute is seeking to alle­
viate unemployment, since preferring employed residents does not 
reduce unemployment. 123 The only reason for the discrimination, 
therefore, would be to keep nonresidents from obtaining employ­
ment within the state. This discrimination is based solely on resi­
dency and has been expressly prohibited by Toomer .124 Therefore, 
the discrimination cannot be justified and the MCCE decision would 
remain unaltered. 
Another distinction between Hicklin and MCCE is the nature of 
the state involvement. In Hicklin, private employers leased state 
land for oil and gas extraction, but there was no state funding or 
other involvement. 125 The Supreme Court stated that land owner­
116. Brief for Defendant Dept. of Labor and Ind. at 23, Massachusetts Council of 
Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2039, 425 N.E.2d 346. 
117. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 207 (1903). 
118. 61 III. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975). 
119. Id. at 273, 335 N.E.2d at 478-79. 
120. Brief of Defendant Dept. of Labor and Ind. at 17, supra note 116. The statute 
was reasonably and substantially related to the valid state interest of securing "the appro­
priate allocation of public funds for the benefit of its residents without unduly impairing 
the constitutionally protected interests of nonresidents." Id. 
121. This provides support for this note's premise that the MCCE opinion did not 
consider all the issues presented to the court. 
122. See supra note 5. 
123. Filling vacant jobs with a person already employed only creates another va­
cant position. Therefore, unemployment is not decreased but remains the same. 
124. 334 U.S. at 396. 
125. 437 U.S. at 530. The Alaskan statute applied to employers who have "no 
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ship alone could not justify the Alaska plan. 126 In MCCE, the Com­
monwealth of Massachusetts owned the land on which the public 
works projects were to be built. It also funded the projects, designed 
them and supervised their construction. The state was in full control 
and had a continuing intimate interest. 
The Supreme Court has labeled state ownership as a crucial fac­
tor in the balancing approach of the privileges and immunities anal­
ysis. 127 Under the substantial reason test, a court must consider state 
ownership of property in determining whether the discrimination 
against nonresidents violates the privileges and immunities clause. 
In this respect, the ownership theory still has some vitality today but 
any power a state has over a resource must be exercised within the 
confines of the constitutional guarantees. 128 
It can be argued that state expenditure of funds to procure pub­
lic works construction is a type of resource management and there­
fore would come under the McCready doctrine. 129 At the very least, 
it would make the ownership of state funds and property a crucial 
factor in determining the validity of the statute. The McCready doc­
trine by itself would not justify a reversal of the MCCE decision 
because the Massachusetts statute cannot pass the substantial reason 
test as long as employed residents are preferred over unemployed 
nonresidents. The MCCE decision, however, would have been more 
exemplary if the court had gone through the analysis. Instead, the 
court's opinion failed to include this doctrine entirely, despite its im­
connection whatsoever with the State's oil and gas, perform no work on state land, have 
no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no payment from the Stale." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
127. 437 U.S. at 528-29. See also Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402; Salla, 48 N.Y.2d at 524, 
399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 882. 
128. Recent Cases, supra note 67, at 360. Toomer expressed a similar view that the 
McCready doctrine, or the special property right of a state in its resources, is a fiction 
stating that a state has power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of its resources. 
But this must be done within the Constitutional command, not to discriminate without 
reason against citizens of another state. 334 U.S. at 402. 
McCready and Corfteld can no longer be viewed as valid on a basis other than an 
ownership theory. Both cases tried to limit employment in extracting and planting shell­
fish for their citizens. When viewed in this light, there is no justification to limit employ­
ment to state citizens. Courts are unlikely to consider employment as the common 
property of a state and therefore a McCready exception to barriers to nonresident em­
ployment is inappropriate. Alaska Hire, supra note 67, at 1076-78. But see Ebbeson v. 
Board of Public Educ., 156 A.286 (1931) where the McCready doctrine was used to up­
hold an employment preference statute in public works and allow the state to prefer its 
own citizens in receiving benefits from its common property to its common owners. 
129. See supra note 65. 
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portance, in determining the validity of a statute. 130 
Another potential exception to the restrictions of the privileges 
and immunities clause, the market participant doctrine,13I was su­
perficially rejected by the court in the MCCE decision. Arguably, 
the market participant doctrine can be applied to MCCE because of 
the "mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of [Article] IV . .. and the Commerce 
Clause."132 The doctrine would allow Massachusetts to favor its res­
idents when the state spent its own money in the construction of 
public works. This favoritism could take the form of qualifying the 
terms of any contract into which the state entered. Those terms may 
well be that an employer, constructing public works funded by state 
money, would have to hire unemployed residents before nonresi­
dents to complete the project. 133 This condition goes only to the first 
level of contract between the state and the contractor, and therefore, 
would still be a valid proprietary interest of the state. 134 
The statute would still be required to meet the substantial 
reason test but the market participant doctrine would weigh in the 
overall balancing of interests like any other factor under considera­
tion. 135 A state may not, however, have a requirement that all busi­
130. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
132. 437 U.S. at 531. Although the Court has considered the two clauses as com­
plementary, there is no case that explicitly allows the market participant doctrine to be 
applied in privileges and immunities clause decisions. Rather, the Court has implicitly 
stated the proposition. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 
U.S. 385 (1948); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 
(1915); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 
(1876). 
133. This condition, that the contractor would have residents of Massachusetts 
completing the construction project whether they were his own employees or a subcon­
tractor's, prevents the contractor from circumventing the condition by having subcon­
tractors do the work with nonresidents. The court distinguished the defendants' 
argument on this point but failed to see that this condition, like other valid market par­
ticipant cases, only applied to the initial contract. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2051, 425 
N.E.2d at 353. 
134. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
In Sa/la, the dissenting opinion thought this issue was determinative. The privileges 
and immunities clause, like the commerce clause, does not restrict a state in its proprie­
tary actions or its spending power. The New York statute was directed only at jobs 
created by New York's exercise of its spending power. 48 N.Y.2d at 526-27,399 N.E.2d 
at 916, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85. 
135. The dissent in Sal/a stated that this argument was enough to sway the balance 
in favor of finding the statute valid under a privileges and immunities analysis when the 
statute was directed only at jobs that the state had created by exercising its spending 
power. 48 N.Y.2d at 526-27, 399 N.E.2d at 915-16, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85. 
This view was also mentioned in Doe. If the state regulation had been concerned 
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nesses in the state give hiring preferences to residents because this 
would be an unreasonable regulation under Hicklin .136 The 
Supreme Court stated in Hicklin that Alaska had little or no proprie­
tary interest in the activities swept within the broad reach of the stat­
ute.137 Massachusetts, however, did not attempt to regulate all 
businesses, as in Hicklin, because the statute only applied to those 
businesses that were constructing public works. The MCCE court 
did not consider the market participant doctrine in this light and ne­
glected to appreciate this valid distinction. Instead, the court inap­
propriately relied upon Hicklin and rejected the defendants 
argument. 138 
Even if the market participant doctrine had been considered by 
the court, however, the outcome of the MCCE decision would not 
ha ve been different. While the doctrine is a factor to be considered, 
it does not provide a valid justification for the absolute preference of 
employed residents over unemployed nonresidents. The market par­
ticipant doctrine remains as an important factor to be considered in 
the delicate balancing process of the privileges and immunities 
clause analysis. It is imperative that courts consider every factor so 
that this analysis will not be short-circuited. 
A proper privileges and immunities clause analysis of the 
MCCE case would examine the statutory language and the facts 
presented to determine if nonresidents were the peculiar source of the 
unemployment that the statute sought to alleviate. The decision 
would have also balanced Massachusetts' proprietary interest, to 
build and finance public works projects, against the right of nonresi­
dents to be free from discrimination based solely on residency. This 
process would ensure that a substantial reason existed for the dis­
crimination practiced upon the nonresidents. 
The Massachusetts statute does not meet the substantial reason 
test because it established a preference for all residents, whether em-
with the spending of state monies, the state could prefer its own residents. Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179 (1973). See also Knox, supra note 17, at 21. Following this view, it seems 
clear that Massachusetts could have limited its public works contracts to residents. 
136. 437 U.S. at 531. 
137. Id. at 529. Alaska sold and leased land to private individuals and then re­
quired those individuals to hire only residents. This is a pure regulation and not a pro­
prietary interest. See Knox, supra note 17, at 19 n.115, 23. But see Wells & Hellerstein, 
supra note 100, at IllS, 1129 (a desire to provide employment for its own residents is 
politically motivated and not a proprietary interest); Knox, supra note 17, at 24 (allowing 
states to avoid privileges and immunities clause restrictions by merely asserting their 
regulations are proprietary interests). 
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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ployed or unemployed. The statute was not aimed at the peculiar 
source of the evil, because employed residents do not contribute to 
unemployment. Even considering the factor of Massachusetts' pro­
prietary interests in the land it owns and the funds it spends does not 
sufficiently mask the discrimination or avoid the conclusion that the 
policy behind the statute is geographic exclusion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts employment preference statute on public 
works construction cannot withstand the scrutiny of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution because it 
was not directed at the peculiar source oJ the evil that the statute 
sought to remedy. The MCCE decision minimized any detrimental 
consequences to the construction industry by allowing contractors to 
operate in a conventional manner by keeping an intact skilled work 
force without reference to residency. The net result will be lower 
costs in the construction of public works projects due to decreased 
operating costs, increased work force efficiency and more competi­
tive bids.139 Although the decision is correct in the final analysis, it 
is lacking an in-depth analysis of the issues. Litigation has been in­
creasing in the past decade under the privileges and immunities 
clause and it would have been beneficial had the court provided 
more guidelines to help clear the confusion that has traditionally 
surrounded the clause. 
The substantial reason test requires the court to examine the 
statute to determine if it is properly aimed at the source of the prob­
lem it seeks to remedy. It also requires that there be a substantial 
relationship between the valid state goal and the discrimination 
practiced. Applying the first part of the substantial reason analysis 
as the court did, one concludes, the statute is not aimed at the pecu­
liar source of the evil. The statute established a preference for all 
residents whether employed or unemployed and is therefore not 
closely tailored. For this reason, the statute cannot be upheld under 
the privileges and immunities clause. 
The court did not stop at this point in the decision but went on 
to examine some other potential justifications of the statute. This 
portion of the decision, however, did not consider the important doc­
trines that other courts have considered to justify state discrimina­
139. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, supra note I; Salla v. County of 
Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d at 524, 399 N.E.2d at 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 883. 
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tion against nonresidents: namely, the market participant and the 
McCready doctrines. 
If the court had examined these judicially created exceptions, as 
it should have in a proper substantial reason test, it might have 
found that the Massachusetts statute was distinguishable from Hick­
lin. The statute covered only a limited area of employment in the 
construction of public works and set the conditions that a private 
party would have to meet in order to do business with the state. Be­
cause this is a condition that extends only to the first level of con­
tract, it is a valid proprietary action of the state. 
State ownership of the property and the funds to finance the 
construction of public works is a crucial factor, as is the valid state 
proprietary function of favoring the residents of the state in expendi­
ture of those funds. These factors, combined with the more narrow 
extent that this statute discriminated against nonresidents compared 
with Hicklin, shows that enough distinctions between MCCE and 
Hicklin existed for the court to provide a more detailed analysis of 
the privileges and immunities clause restriction. 
A proper privileges and immunities analysis would have consid­
ered the valid distinctions between MCCE and Hicklin. The court 
would have weighed the market participant and McCready doctrines 
as well as considered the language of the statute to determine 
whether the statute unreasonably discriminated against nonresi­
dents. This omission by the court seriously affects the force and use­
fulness of its decision. 
If the statute had been drawn to prefer only unemployed resi­
dents rather than all residents, the critical flaw of the statute, the 
court intimated that it would have affirmed the law. In this situa­
tion, the exceptions to privileges and immunities clause scrutiny 
would then shift the balance to weigh in favor of the state. Thus, 
Massachusetts may validly prefer its unemployed residents, when it 
decides to spend state money on the construction of public works, 
and provide benefits to those people who have contributed to the 
state funds. 
John Lauring 
